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The political organizations known as 527s1 have grown in number, size, and importance
since their inception just a few short years ago. While formed as a campaigning tool, allowing
candidate supporters some leniency in fundraising and campaign expenditures, they now figure
prominently within political parties, facilitating coordination across different branches of the
parties and providing employment for key party actors.
Just how central are these 527s to the parties, however? What do they enable parties to
do? And do the parties utilize these 527s equally? It is conceivable, after all, that a minority
party would find such a non-traditional party group especially useful, while a majority party
could rely on its access to the federal bureaucracy to provide jobs and coordination for its main
supporters.
This paper will address the above questions using an innovative dataset: the employment
records of the nation’s largest 527s between 2004 and 2006. Those employees’ other
organizational ties are probed, revealing a vast network tying partisan actors together via the
527s. We first examine the overall network charted out by 527s, and then divide it by the
partisan affiliations of those organizations. The findings suggest that the Republican Party, the
majority party during the period under study, developed a more hierarchical 527 network than
the Democrats did. This study further testifies to the central role that 527s play in coordinating
party efforts.

The Party Network

1

So-called “527s” have thrived in the wake of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and derive their name from
section 527 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, which determines the taxation status of political organizations. 527s are
considered to be tax-exempt. However, since they do not expressly advocate for or against a candidate, 527s do not fall
under the limits on donations and expenditures enforced by the Federal Election Commission.
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Political parties today can best be understood not only as a series of committees with
offices on Capitol Hill, but as webs of relationships between political actors. Two partisan
networks, one Democratic and one Republican, assist candidates, plot campaign strategies, and
coordinate governing tasks. While the notion of parties as more hierarchical and formal
organizations in the style of Tammany Hall or Mayor Daley’s Chicago may have made sense in
an earlier age, the network concept helps explain much political activity in the modern era
(Bedlington and Malbin 2003; Bernstein and Dominguez 2003; Bernstein 1999, 2000, and 2004;
Bimes and Dominguez 2004; Cohen et al 2008; Doherty 2003, 2005, and 2006; Dominguez 2003
and 2005a; Heberlig and Larson 2005 and 2007; Kolodny 1998; Kolodny and Dulio 2001 and
2003; Kolodny and Logan 1998; Masket 2009; Schlesinger 1985, Schwartz 1990; Skinner 2004,
2005, and 2007).
The rapid growth of 527s in the wake of the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act in 2002 appears to have bolstered the reshaping of parties as networks. 527s were created by
leading operatives in both major parties, using them to fulfill the functions previously supported
by soft money: broadcast advertising and voter mobilization. Probably the most notable 527s
were those that composed a Democratic “shadow party”: America Coming Together, America
Votes, and the Media Fund. There were Republican 527s as well, including Progress for America
and Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. Of course, there were many pre-existing 527 organizations,
such as those operated by the Sierra Club and the League of Conservation Voters.
Whatever these groups accomplished, they did not undermine the role of political parties.
Party leaders encouraged their formation, longtime party operatives composed their staffs,
partisan interest groups lent them assistance and partisan donors contributed their funds. The 527
groups generally pursued strategies compatible with party goals, whether America Coming
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Together’s mobilization of Democratic-leaning voters or the Swift Boat Vets’ criticism of John
Kerry’s Vietnam record. The 527 groups were not competing with the parties; they were nodes
within the broader party networks (Skinner 2005).

527s as “Shadow Parties”
The leadership of the so-called “527” organizations formed after the passage of BCRA –
America Coming Together, the Media Fund, America Votes – included not only veterans of the
Clinton White House and the Democratic National Committee, but also longtime officials of the
AFL-CIO, EMILY’s List, and the Sierra Club. Both former President Bill Clinton and
Democratic National Committee chairman Terry McAuliffe strongly encouraged the formation
of these entities.
After the passage of BCRA, McAuliffe established a Task Force on BCRA that included
Harold Ickes, former deputy chief of staff to Bill Clinton; Michael Whouley, a longtime
Democratic operative who worked for both the Al Gore and John Kerry presidential campaigns;
John Podesta, former White House Chief of Staff for Clinton; as well as two top officials of the
DNC. Ickes devised the Media Fund (to conduct broadcast advertising previously funded by soft
money), which he subsequently led; before BCRA became effective, McAuliffe encouraged
leading Democratic donors to give to the new organization (Weissman and Hassan 2006).
Ickes also helped devise America Coming Together and America Votes through meetings
with top members of the Democratic Party network. These included Sierra Club director Carl
Pope, EMILY’s List president Ellen Malcolm (who also serves on the DNC’s executive
committee), SEIU president Andrew Stern, and former AFL-CIO political director Steve
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Rosenthal. They agreed on the need to coordinate interest-group electoral operations; this
became America Votes (Weissman and Hassan 2006)
Stern and Rosenthal also discussed their desire to create a “ground war” operation funded
by unions, and that would apply to the general public the voter-turnout techniques used to
mobilize union members. This eventually became America Coming Together; billionaire George
Soros and insurance tycoon Peter Lewis pledged $20 million to fund ACT as long as Rosenthal
controlled its operations (Weissman and Hassan 2006). Malcolm and Ickes formed the Joint
Victory Campaign to raise money for all three groups. With the assistance of Soros and Bill
Clinton, Malcolm and Ickes wooed many of the party’s top donors; Hollywood producer Steve
Bing was among the many onetime soft-money givers who helped fund ACT and the Media
Fund (Weissman and Hassan 2006).
During the campaign, ACT, America Votes, and the Media Fund, along with two laborbacked 527s, were all headquartered in the same building in downtown Washington, across the
street from the AFL-CIO’s headquarters. By the fall of 2004, ACT had 55 offices in 17 states,
and 1300 paid canvassers working to turn out Democratic voters (Dwyer et al 2004) Not only
was the leadership of the “shadow party” groups deeply embedded in the party networks, their
staff was, too. Both the Media Fund and ACT hired the Thunder Road Group, run by former
Kerry campaign manager Jim Jordan, to handle their communications. Larry Gold served both as
counsel for ACT and for the AFL-CIO. Bill Knapp served as a consultant for the Media Fund
before he quit to work for the Kerry campaign (Drinkard 2004). (Due to lack of funding, ACT
disbanded after the 2004 election.)
America Votes held bi-weekly meetings of liberal activists to plot strategy. America
Votes allowed member organizations to share voter files, survey data, and demographic
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information. This allowed America Votes staff to coordinate the efforts of groups such as the
Sierra Club, NARAL Pro-Choice America, and the League of Conservation Voters in stimulating
voter turnout and contacting swing voters. America Votes targeted 13 battleground states; the
organization remained active in later elections at a lower level of activity (Hadfield 2004).2 The
groups involved in America Votes are central elements in the Democratic Party network; they
put the lie to the conventional wisdom that interest groups always undermine political parties.
The Democratic “shadow party” was primarily funded by a few very large donors, many
of them who had given large amounts of “soft money” to party committees. These included some
leading unions, such as AFSCME, SEIU, the Teamsters, and the American Federation of
Teachers. But there were also several large individual donors who had been longtime supporters
of the Democratic Party, most notably Soros and Lewis.

A Republican “Shadow”
Republicans were initially reluctant to set up their own 527 organizations; the RNC had
never depended as much on soft money as the DNC had, the Bush re-election campaign could
raise as much money as it needed, and the legal status of 527’s seemed shaky at first. But
eventually a Republican “shadow” emerged. Progress for America, a leading Republican 527
group, was also run by people active in their party network. PFA was founded in 2001 by Tony
Feather, political director of the 2000 Bush-Cheney campaign, and ally of Bush advisor Karl

2

Members of America Votes included ACORN, the AFL-CIO, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME), ACT, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(ATLA), the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Clean Water Action, Defenders of Wildlife, Democracy for
America, EMILY’s List, Environment 2004, Human Rights Campaign, League of Conservation Voters (LCV), the Media
Fund, MoveOn.org, Moving America Forward, Music for America, the NAACP National Voter Fund, NARAL Pro-Choice
America, the National Education Association (NEA), the National Jewish Democratic Council, the National Treasury
Employees Union, the Partnership for American Families, the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU), the Sierra Club, USAction, the Young Voter Alliances, Voices for Working
Families, and 21st Century Democrats.
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Rove; after a year of inactivity, Feather handed over PFA to Chris LaCivita, former political
director for the NRSC. In the spring of 2004, Brian McCabe took over PFA; McCabe was a
partner in the DCI Group, a political consulting firm, which later did work for the Bush
campaign. Another DCI partner, Tom Synhorst, served as an advisor to PFA; he had worked as
an advisor to the 2000 Bush campaign and helped run the 1996 and 2000 Republican national
conventions (Weissman and Hassan 2006). Benjamin Ginsberg served as counsel to PFA; he
served in similar capacities for both the 2004 Bush re-election effort and Swift Boat Veterans for
Truth. The Swift Boat organizers approached PFA, seeking advice; PFA personnel encouraged
them to see LaCivita, who became an advisor to the group (Weissman and Hassan 2006; Stone
2003a).
PFA became a 527 organization in May 2004, after the FEC decided not to regulate 527s;
Bush-Cheney campaign chairman Marc Racicot and RNC chairman Ed Gillespie soon released a
statement urging support for PFA and other sympathetic 527s. PFA quickly gained access to the
financial resources of the Republican party network, hiring some well-connected fundraisers
(such as Texas public relations executive James Francis), holding an event at the national
convention, and gaining the assistance of such party stalwarts as San Diego Chargers owner Alex
Spanos (Weissman and Hassan 2006; Drinkard 2004; Cannon 2004). Much like the Democratic
“shadow party,” PFA relied on a small number of large donors, most of them longtime supports
of the GOP.

Parties and Hierarchies
A number of experimental and observational studies have confirmed important
differences between the two major political parties, both as organizations and as collections of
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different types of individuals. On the individual level, Republicans appear to be more
comfortable than Democrats in leaving important party decisions up to party leaders, while
Democrats seem to prefer aspects of internal democracy. Freeman (1986) found important
behavior and attitudinal differences between Democrats and Republicans. Perhaps relatedly,
Republican Party organizations tend to be more hierarchical than Democratic ones. As Freeman
(1986, 329) stated,
The Democratic Party is pluralistic and polycentric. It has multiple power centers
that compete for membership support in order to make demands on, as well as
determine, the leaders. The Republicans have a unitary party in which great
deference is paid to the leadership, activists are expected to be “good soldiers,”
and competing loyalties are frowned upon.
Democrats feel comfortable engaging in formal recognition of diversity; Republicans
avoid it when they can. Democrats demand open discussion and representativeness;
Republicans prefer top-down leadership and demonstrations of unity. Democratic
conventions have seen numerous fights over credentials and legitimacy, while the
Republicans usually rally around their nominee (Freeman 1986). Shafer (1986) notes
differences between the parties’ delegates, with Democrats more given to flamboyant
displays of individualism, while Republicans prefer deference to authority and reliance
on formal channels of communication.
Klinkner (1995) finds that the Democratic and Republican national committees
differ systematically in their responses to electoral defeat. Democrats engage in
procedural reform, whether to produce greater accountability or to accommodate the
various factions in their oft-fragmented coalition. Democrats are also more likely to
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formulate policy-based responses, such as those pursued by the liberal-leaning
Democratic Advisory Council of the late 1950s or the centrist Democratic Leadership
Council in the Reagan-Bush years. Both responses reflect a willingness to tolerate open
disagreement and to make inclusiveness a priority.
By contrast, Republicans prefer “nuts-and-bolts” organizational retooling,
epitomized by the pragmatic work engaged in by Ray Bliss after Goldwater’s 1964 loss
and by Bill Brock after Watergate. Both chairmen emphasized improving party
fundraising, revitalizing the grassroots, and recruiting stronger candidates. In the 1960s
and 1970s, as they saw the party apparatus fall under the sway of conservatives (fueled
by the rise of direct mail), moderate and liberal Republicans avoided overt attempts to
challenge the GOP’s dominant ideology or to gain a stronger voice within the RNC.
Open clashes over philosophy rarely occurred among Republicans, even after major
defeats. Occasionally, the GOP will woo specific constituencies, as the RNC’s Southern
Division did in the 1960s, or as Brock courted Evangelicals and blue-collar workers
during the Carter presidency. But overt group consciousness cuts against the grain of a
party culture that emphasizes homogeneity and hierarchy (Klinkner 1995).
Democratic culture tends to accommodate groups to a much greater extent. This
reflects not only differences in folkways, but also the reality of the internal dynamics of
the party. Berry (1999) finds that liberal citizen groups, many of them active in
Democratic politics, have far outstripped their conservative counterparts in influence and
prestige. The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, especially those involving
women and African-Americans, usually preferred to participate in the Democratic party,
given its support for activist government and openness to out-groups. By contrast,
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Republican women were recruited through pre-existing partisan channels; efforts by GOP
feminists to gain greater recognition bore little fruit (Baer and Bostitis 1988). Dark
(1998) illustrates a decades-long alliance between organized labor and the Democratic
Party; one in which there has been more continuity than change. Indeed, Republican
operatives have often envied unions’ success at grassroots organizing; both the Christian
Coalition and the RNC’s “72-Hour Project” were modeled, in part, on labor’s turnout
efforts.
By contrast, while business has funded the GOP since the days of McKinley and
Hanna, corporations otherwise avoid overt political involvement. One prominent
lobbyist for a peak business association has commented, “Business traditionally doesn’t
like politics. I mean, it’s just easier to write a check, it’s easier to contribute to a
candidate, a party” (Skinner 2007). Urban machines long served as a valuable base for
the Democratic Party, receiving in return for their labor-intensive operations, not only
patronage but also recognition for their ethnic constituents. Republican Party
organization has usually been stronger at the state and national levels, and has relied
more on capital-intensive techniques like advertising (Erie 1990; Klinkner 1995). Time
and again, Democratic volunteers have demanded a greater voice in party councils; one
sees similar rhetoric used by “reformers” enamored of Adlai Stevenson, anti-war activists
supporting George McGovern, or 21st century liberals backing Howard Dean.
Republicans have their own ideological devotees, but they rarely concern themselves
with procedural reform. If anything, the rise of conservatism in the 1960s and 1970s only
increased the homogeneity within the GOP (Miller and Jennings 1986).
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Testing the Network Model
From what we know about party networks from both past scholarship and anecdotal
accounts of 527s as shadow parties we develop and test the following hypotheses: 1) 527s are a
central component to the party network by being connected to formal party structures and
institutions as well as campaigns and other interest groups; 2) 527s facilitate coordination
between disparate groups in the party network; and 3) there are important differences in the
structure and behavior of the Democratic and Republican party networks.
To begin, we identified a sample of 527 organizations. For this initial analysis, we
identified roughly the top 100 527 committees from the 2004 and 2006 elections in terms of
spending. These were taken from lists provided by both the Campaign Finance Institute (CFI)
and the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).3 The list of 527s included in this analysis consist
of 18 Republican-oriented groups and 67 Democratic-oriented groups. (The fact that the top 100
527s are so dominated by Democrats provides some evidence in support of hypothesis 3.)
Once a sample of 527s was identified, the data used to test the above hypotheses were
collected through several stages. First, because we were interested in the connections individuals
associated with 527 organizations have to the wider party network, we needed to identify a data
source that provided consistent and reliable information on those individuals responsible for
starting, the daily operation of, and strategic direction of each 527 organization. We could have
done a simple Google search to try and identify key players in each 527, but that would have
been too unreliable, as we could not know for sure if we had collected all the key individuals at
each organization. Because each are organized differently (for instance, some are more
decentralized than others; some are more hierarchical than others; some have larger staff

3

Lists of these committees can be found at the CFI and CRP websites: www.cfinst.org and www.opensecrets.org,
respectfully.
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structures than others, etc.) we could not be confident that a simple search through an Internet
search engine would be exhaustive.
During 2004, 527s did not have to report any of their activity to the Federal Election
Commission. Fortunately, 527s, since their inception, have been required to file paperwork with
the Internal Revenue Service. These committees must file several types of forms with the IRS,
including Form 8871, “Political Organization Notice of Section 527 Status,” and Form 8872,
“Political Organization Report of Contributions and Expenditures,” and Form 990 “Return of
Organization Exempt From Income Tax” (this last form serves basically as a tax return for the
committee). Two of these forms – 8871 and 990 – require the 527 to submit names of “officers,
directors, trustees, and key employees,” in addition to other form-specific information. We used
the individuals listed on these forms as a means of compiling a list of individuals associated with
each 527 committee in the sample. Getting to a final list of individuals was also a multi-step
process.
One hurdle in identifying individuals associated with each particular 527 was the
similarity of the names of many 527 committees. For instance, in the case of labor unions, a
search for the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) turned up both state-focused
organizations and local unions; the same was true for the Club for Growth and many other
committees. When originally filing an 8871 form notifying the IRS that a group is claiming 527
status, they are issued a unique Employer Identification Number (EIN). To avoid any over
counting or undercounting of individuals, once the main committee was identified, we searched
for forms filed under the group’s EIN; this allowed us to be confident that we were only
identifying forms associated with the particular group in which we were interested.
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Moreover, each group filed multiple forms with the IRS at many different intervals. For
instance, the Democratic group Voices for Working Families filed four separate 8871 forms and
one 990 form that covered the 2004 election cycle, while the Club for Growth filed three 8871s
along with their 990. The 8871, again, is the form a group must file to notify the IRS that they
are requesting 527 status; any change to a group, be it an address change, or more importantly
for our purposes, a change in the officers or key staff, must be accompanied by an amended
8871; thus the need for multiple filings.
In order to come to a final list of “officers, directors, trustees, and key employees” we
examined each of the forms filed by a particular 527 during the 2004 election cycle (defined as
January 2003 through December 2004) or the 2006 cycle (defined as January 2005 through
December 2006). Any individual appearing on any form filed with the IRS covering these time
frames was included as someone associated with the 527. In the vast majority of cases, only a
few changes in staff structure took place during each election cycle (even though there is
considerable turnover across cycles). For the 527 committees included here, the number of
officers and/or key staff ranged from one (The November Fund) to 39 (League of Conservation
Voters).
Connections to the party network were determined by researching the employment and/or
association history of each of the “officers, directors, trustees, and key employees” for each
committee in the analysis. This was done through general Internet searching, although a few
sources were more fruitful than others. These included a search of newspapers and publications
in the Washington, DC area (Washington Post, The Hill, Roll Call, Campaigns & Elections
magazine, for instance), a particular web site called SourceWatch,4 and general web searches that

4

According to the SourceWatch site, “SourceWatch is a collaborative project of the Center for Media and Democracy to
produce a directory of the people, organizations and issues shaping the public agenda. A primary purpose of SourceWatch is
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turned up individuals’ biographies and/or employment histories on web sites where they were
currently or formerly employed or had an affiliation. For the 527s active in 2004, any related
connection to the party network that an individual had during 2004 or before was included in the
dataset, and for the 2006 cycle any related connection to the party network that an individual had
during 2004 or before was included.
The resulting dataset is, in a way, incomplete. While we know the links between each
527 and its affiliated groups, we are less certain about the links from one affiliated group to
another. For example, the 527 EMILY’s List is tied to the Human Rights Campaign and the
Gore 2000 presidential campaign through personnel. It is certainly possible that HRC and the
Gore campaign had personnel in common, as well. However, this dataset does not contain such
information.

Results
Our data were collected in the form of a grid, with 527s as columns and the associations
to which the 527 employees belonged (henceforth “affiliated groups”) as rows. This dataset was
then analyzed as a two-mode matrix using UCINET 6.214, NetDraw 2.084, Pajek 1.02, and
igraph 0.5.2. Where necessary for the purposes of analysis, the two-mode matrix was converted
to a bipartite matrix, with both 527s and affiliated groups appearing in both the rows and
columns. The two-mode analysis allows us to see the relationships between the 527s and the
other organizations with which they are affiliated. Our data recorded the number of employees
documenting the PR and propaganda activities of public relations firms and public relations professionals engaged in
managing and manipulating public perception, opinion and policy. SourceWatch also includes profiles on think tanks,
industry-funded organizations and industry-friendly experts that work to influence public opinion and public policy on
behalf of corporations, governments and special interests. Over time, SourceWatch has broadened to include others
involved in public debates including media outlets, journalists and government agencies. Unlike some other wikis,
SourceWatch has a policy of strict referencing, and is overseen by a paid editor. SourceWatch has 37,220 articles”
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that 527s shared with affiliated groups, and the networks were therefore analyzed as valued
datasets.
We can visually track the links between 527s and organization in Figure 1, which charts
out the entire 527 network. For the sake of clarity, isolates (nodes with zero connections) were
omitted from this diagram.
This image and others were created using NetDraw’s “spring-embedding” algorithm,
with nodes repositioned slightly to improve readability. The node sizes are weighted by the
nodes’ “betweenness” centrality, a measure of connectedness. (Nodes with high betweenness
scores in a network are generally interpreted to be acting as “brokers” – they have great influence
as conduits in the network (see Hanneman and Riddle 2005). 527s are indicated by blue squares.
The affiliated groups are marked by red circles. The most central nodes (those with the highest
betweenness centrality scores) are labeled.
Figure 1
One of the more obvious and interesting characteristics of this network is that it is totally
dominated by Democratic-leaning organizations. The 527s with the highest betweenness scores
are the left-leaning America Votes, America Coming Together (ACT), the Gay and Lesbian
Victory Fund, Twenty-first Century Democrats, Environment 2004, and the League of
Conservation Voters (LCV). Two right-leaning 527s – Republicans Abroad and Republican
National Lawyers – are labeled in the figure but have much lower centrality scores, each
connected to just a few other nodes. Additionally, most of the more connected organizations in
this network have a Democratic cant to them, including the DNC and the Clinton administration.
The Democratic dominance of this network is no doubt due to the fact that there are many more

(www.sourcewatch.org). We believe the last two sentences are key to having confidence in the information on this site, as
opposed to a page such as Wikipedia.
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Democratic 527s than Republican ones. Indeed, as mentioned previously, of the 100 largest
527s we examined, 67 were affiliated with the Democrats, 18 with the Republicans.
Another somewhat surprising feature of the network is that it does not appear to be
partitioned into liberal and conservative factions. A number of Republican-leaning 527s are
linked, via an association, to Democratic-leaning 527s. The conservative Republicans Abroad,
for example, is linked to the liberal League of Conservation Voters by having members who
have served in the media and on Capitol Hill. In another example, the left-leaning 527 Voices
for Working Families is connected to College Republicans. The link there is a woman named
Patricia Friend, who at one point ran the Association of Flight Attendants but also served on a
post-9/11 safety advisory panel for the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration link
creates a path between the leftwing and rightwing 527s. There are enough such individual cases
to connect any Republican-leaning 527 to a Democratic-leaning one in just two steps.
Despite the bipartisanship of this network, the structure itself provides insight into the
nature of a modern political party. Consistent with the view that a modern party is best thought
of as a expanded network of political actors, rather than just a hierarchy within a formal
organization, the 527 image shows that interest groups are vital players.
An “egonet” image for one 527, Americans Coming Together, is displayed in Figure 2,
and shows just how connected this 527 is. ACT has direct personnel connections to nearly three
dozen leading Democratic associations, including presidential campaigns, interest groups, and
formal party organizations. This is a group that is clearly pivotal within the party. Rather than a
fringe group with only loose ties to partisan actors, it is in a position to broker communications
between various groups within the party.
Figure 2
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To further examine the network structure of the parties, it is helpful to separate out the
networks charted by Republican and Democratic 527s. Direct comparisons between different
networks are somewhat challenging, particularly when the networks are of different sizes
(Anderson et al. 1999). There exist a number of graph-level indices (GLIs) that could help in
comparisons, but common GLIs like density (the number of existing connections divided by the
number of possible connections) are easily influenced by the total number of nodes in a network.
Nonetheless, researchers have developed various ways to compare networks either by controlling
for size (Bonacich et al. 1998) or by using measures that are resistant to changes in N (Faust and
Skvoretz 2002, Faust 2006, Snijders 1981, Snijders and Baerveldt 2003). We largely pursue the
latter approach.
Our first method involves calculating normalized Bonacich alpha power scores for all the
nodes in the networks and then testing to see if those scores are distributed differently across
parties (Bonacich 1987). Bonacich power scores essentially determine the influence of each
node with respect to its surrounding nodes. The distribution of these scores among the two
networks can be seen in Figure 3, a kernel density plot in which each party’s scores have been
adjusted to have the same mean.
Figure 3
As the figure shows, the Republican network has a somewhat broader range of alpha
power scores, while the Democratic nodes are more concentrated around zero. A KolmogorovSmirnov test reveals that the Republican Party network’s power score distribution is significantly
different from that of the Democrats’ (P = .000). Additionally, an F-test confirms that the
Republican network’s power scores have a higher standard deviation (36.23) than do the
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Democrats’ (31.70) a difference that is highly statistically significant (p ≤ .001).5 What this
suggests is that there is a wider range of power status in the Republican Party and somewhat
greater equality of nodes within the Democratic Party, suggesting that the GOP is the more
hierarchical of the two.
Another useful way to compare the two parties’ networks is through visual illustration.
The network charted by the 18 Republican-affiliated 527s in our dataset appears in Figure 4. The
527s are depicted as square nodes and are labeled. The affiliated groups are depicted as circles.
This is a relatively thin network (partially due to its small size). For this network, we conducted
the community detection algorithm designed by Girvan and Newman (2002) and made available
within NetDraw (Porter et al 2009). The nodes have been colored by their affiliations with
communities. The Girvan-Newman algorithm detected ten communities (with a Q-value of
.756). There appears to be a dominant community in this network, consisting of Republicans
Abroad, the GOP National Convention Delegates of 2004, Republican National Lawyers, the
National Federation of Republican Women, and the Republican Leadership Coalition. There is a
more business-oriented community consisting of GOPAC and the Club for Growth, as well.
Figure 4
Figure 5 shows the network charted by the Democratic leaning 527s. The community
detection process identified ten different communities within the Democratic network (with a Qvalue of .401). There appear to be three main communities within this network, one (in black)
consisting of general interest liberal causes, including the environment, a second one (in green)
consisting largely of labor unions, and a third (in gray) consisting of artistic and campaigning
pursuits. A few other communities address particular interests within the coalition. There is no
obviously dominant community within the Democratic network, unlike within its Republican
5

This result holds even when outliers are excluded.
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counterpart. Again this lends support for the notion that the Republican party has the more
hierarchical organization.
Figure 5
Table 1 provides a set of descriptive statistics for each of the two parties’ networks, as
calculated by igraph. These statistics are highly informative about the hierarchical nature of each
network. They can be defined as follows:
•

Degree – The average measure of degree centrality (the number of direct
connections with other nodes) for all nodes in the network, with standard
deviations in parentheses.

•

Degree-degree correlation – The Pearson correlation of the degree centrality for
each ego and its alter. If the correlation is highly positive, then nodes tend to be
connected to other nodes that are as connected as they are. If the correlation is
negative, it suggests a more hierarchical network in which highly connected nodes
are linked to relatively isolated nodes.

•

Average clustering coefficient – The clustering coefficient measures how closely
each node and its immediate neighbors constitute a complete graph (or a “small
world”).

The statistics portrayed in this table suggest some similarities and differences across the
two networks. The nodes in the Democratic networks, interestingly, have a somewhat higher
degree centrality than those in the Republican network, although that difference is much smaller
than the standard deviation for either network.
Table 1
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The degree-degree correlations for both networks are negative but essentially identical to
each other. The clustering coefficients, meanwhile, are small for both parties, suggesting that
very few nodes and their immediate neighbors constitute a “small world” in these networks.
However, the figure is higher for the Democratic network, indicating a somewhat less
hierarchical world. These measures tend toward a conclusion that the Republican Party is the
more hierarchical of the two.
Table 2 and Table 3 list the ten most central 527s in the Republican and Democratic
networks, respectively. They are listed in declining order of degree centrality (number of
connections). However, two other measures of centrality are listed here, as well: betweenness
and Eigenvector. In both tables, the highest score in one measure corresponds to the highest in
the other two, giving us greater confidence that we have identified the truly important 527s in
each party. These appear to be Republican National Lawyers in the GOP and Environment 2004
among the Democrats, although those groups have close rivals.
Table 2 and Table 3
A final bit of analysis involves collapsing the two-mode datasets into one-mode datasets,
focusing on the affiliated organizations within each party. This is done to address the question of
what 527s allow a party to do. Projecting a one-mode matrix from a two-mode one does have its
drawbacks. The main drawback is that such projection tends to exaggerate clustering (Latapy et
al 2008, Nyhan 2009). Thus we do not examine these networks for community structures.
Nonetheless, these projections are useful for identifying the critical organizations within each
party, understanding how they interact with the aid of 527s, and examining differences between
the parties.
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As with the two-mode network, we calculated normalized Bonacich alpha power scores
and examined their distributions, which can be seen in Figure 6. Again, the Republican nodes
seem to have a broader distribution of power. An F-test confirms that the Republican power
scores have the higher standard deviation (33.61 compared to the Democrats’ 27.97), a
difference that is statistically significant (p ≤ .001).
Figure 6
Table 4 shows the same set of statistics that we saw in Table 1, only for one-mode
networks that are collapsed around the affiliated groups. Of note is that the degree centrality of
nodes is much higher in the Democratic one-mode network than in the Republican one.
Interestingly, the degree-degree correlation is higher for Republicans (.270 compared to .045),
suggesting that well-connected nodes are more likely to be connected to similarly connected
nodes within the Republican network. Similarly, while the clustering coefficients are high in
both networks, it is somewhat higher among Republicans, suggesting that “small worlds” are
more common within the Republican network. These findings are somewhat mixed as to which
party’s network has the more hierarchical structure.
Table 4
We next turn to graphical depictions of these projected one-mode networks. Figure 7
shows the organizations tied to each other through Republican 527s. The nodes are weighted by
betweenness centrality, again emphasizing those with key positions to facilitate information and
personnel transfers throughout the party network. While there are a great many relatively minor
groups, both from the political and business communities, the more central ones are easily
identified. The RNC occupies a central role in the network, as do the three most recent
Republican presidential administrations. Two private groups, the Club for Growth and the
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National Council on Crime and Delinquency, seem to act as a pivots between several other
groups. These are all obviously important Republican organizations, and the 527s allow them to
coordinate.
Figure 7
The Democratic one-mode network, shown in Figure 8, is also similar to what we might
expect to see. The key hiring places within the party network are the DNC and the most recent
presidential administrations prior to 2009 (Clinton and Carter). The Dewey Square Group (a
prominent political consulting firm) also occupies a key place in the party network, as does the
AFL-CIO. The combination of government offices, consultants, and unions is the source of
electioneering labor in the Democratic Party and is a fair representation of the party’s leadership
today.
Figure 8

Discussion
This analysis has demonstrated that 527s are important and central to the broader party
networks in the American political system. Through their personnel connections, 527s are far
from being fringe groups; they are in a position to facilitate collective action among virtually all
key party actors. Parties, after all, are not just a collection of activists, donors, and formal party
groups; they are all these actors coordinating efforts. It appears from this study that 527s do
much to enable this coordination.
This analysis was also able to determine the community structure of the party networks,
finding important differences between the parties. While both parties maintain some degree of
hierarchy, the preponderance of visual and quantitative evidence supports a conclusion that the
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Republican network is the more hierarchical of the two. This is actually consistent with much of
the literature on the two parties’ organizational styles. It is certainly possible that our finding is a
function of a particular time period during which the Democratic Party controlled neither the
Congress nor the White House and relied extensively upon 527s to aid in party coordination.
However, we might expect the Democrats to be the more hierarchical party under such
circumstances; it is somewhat surprising to find these historical party traits holding even at a
time when hierarchy would have been so advantageous for the Democrats.
By collapsing the two-mode matrices into one-mode ones, we were able to identify the
key actors in each party network and to demonstrate how 527s enable collaboration between
them. The resulting images were a stark confirmation of the common images of the two parties,
with both dominated by presidential administrations and the formal party groups, but the
Republicans also reserving a key place for conservative advocacy groups and the Democrats
dominated by labor unions.
One of the surprising findings in our study was the level of bipartisanship in the overall
527 network. These cross-party connections may be only superficial in nature – it is doubtful
that there is much strategic coordination between the League of Conservation Voters and the
Club for Growth – but there are too many of them to dismiss them as mere noise. This may
suggest something inherently different about the people who group together as 527s when
compared to those who work within the more traditional party groups.
In the future, we hope to examine the different sorts of networks charted out by different
types of employees. For example, technical staffers (fundraisers, human resources personnel,
etc.) may produce a more bipartisan network than political staffers. We also hope to examine
how these networks change over time. The emergence of a new presidential administration in
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2009 and a shift in partisan control of both the Congress and the White House present an exciting
opportunity to observe the dynamics of party networks.
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics for Two-Mode Partisan 527 Networks
Republican Network
2.24 (5.20)

Democratic Network
2.81 (8.15)

Degree-degree correlation

-.110

-.117

Average Clustering
Coefficient

.005

.040

Average degree
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Table 2 - Ten Most Central Republican 527s
Name of 527
Republican National Lawyers
Republicans Abroad
Club for Growth
Wishlist
GOPAC
Softer Voices
College Republicans
Swiftvets
Save American Medicine
Republican_Leadership_Council

Degree
50
43
36
24
22
20
18
17
16
15

Betweenness Eigenvector
12841.21
0.156
10868.34
0.133
8990.43
0.01
6365.40
0.015
6290.88
0.008
4885.22
0.007
5681.62
0.007
4106.24
0.006
3794.67
0.006
3695.66
0.006

Note: 527s are listed in declining order of degree centrality.

Table 3 - Ten Most Central Democratic 527s
Name of 527
Environment 2004
Twenty-first Century Democrats
League of Conservation Voters
Gay Lesbian Victory Fund
Voices for Working Families
America Votes
Grassroots Democrats
ACT
Sierra Club
Planned Parenthood Votes

Degree
107
87
84
77
76
68
46
42
40
33

Note: 527s are listed in declining order of degree centrality.

Betweenness Eigenvector
51316.78
0.101
41521.34
0.042
40313.37
0.068
39648.27
0.029
38544.97
0.027
32123.60
0.064
19610.33
0.027
15976.33
0.032
19893.82
0.007
14377.09
0.013
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Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics for One-Mode Networks
Republican Network
30.21 (21.25)

Democratic Network
68.05 (54.60)

Degree-degree correlation

.270

.045

Average Clustering
Coefficient

.958

.916

Average degree
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Figure 1 -- 527s and Associated Groups

Figure created by NetDraw 2.084. Blue squares indicate 527 organizations; red circles are associated groups. Node
sizes are weighted by betweenness centrality. Isolates have been omitted for clarity.
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Figure 2 -- Egonet for America Coming Together

Notes: Lines connecting nodes are weighted by number of shared employees.
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Figure 3 - Kernel Density Plot of Normalized Bonacich Alpha Scores, Two-Mode Networks

Red solid line = Republicans
Blue dashed line = Democrats

37

Figure 4 -- Network of Republican-Affiliated 527s

Note: Image created by NetDraw. Squares are 527 organizations, circles are affiliated organizations. 527s are
labeled and are color-coded by communities, as detected by the Girvan-Newman algorithm. Isolates have been
eliminated for ease of viewing.
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Figure 5 –- Network of Democratic-Affiliated 527s

Note: Image created by NetDraw. Squares are 527 organizations, circles are affiliated organizations. 527s are
labeled and are color-coded by communities, as detected by the Girvan-Newman algorithm. Pendants and isolates
have been eliminated for ease of viewing.
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Figure 6 – Kernel Density Plot of Normalized Bonacich Alpha Scores, One-Mode Networks

Red solid line = Republicans
Blue dashed line = Democrats
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Figure 7 - Organizations Tied by Republican 527s
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Figure 8 - Organizations Tied by Democratic 527s

